Why pakistani hate india

Trade normalization alone will not fix everything because, as Cohen points out, any prospect of major breakthroughs can easily "be blown apart" by serious miscalculations, faulty foreign interventions, or terrorism. There are too many spoilers between India and Pakistan for one facet of their relationship to become an all-encompassing solution for peace. Cohen mentions dialogues between former policymakers and civil society organizations, backchannel discussions between government officials, and foreign efforts to normalize, but concludes that none of them will work.

Instead, he makes a prediction: trade openings will reduce tension, but a "hurting stalemate will continue. He offers a few other scenarios worse than this one, and in the end, none lend themselves to optimism. He dismisses as insignificant the ongoing efforts to collaborate on energy, the environment, and accepting the status quo in Kashmir. While Cohen could have written a more succinct book with a sharper argument, his reasoning is right on the mark.

During the Cold War, Pakistan accepted millions of dollars in U. The Americans and Soviets were able to use India and Pakistan in their cold war fight, while the Indians and Pakistanis used their external allies to strengthen conventional military capabilities against the other. Cohen begins the book by blaming the British and ends it with blaming the Americans. In the final chapter on "American Interests and Policies," he writes, "the Obama administration failed to develop a South Asia policy that would have encompassed both India-Pakistan relations including Kashmir and the grinding war in Afghanistan.

Holbrooke, was persona non grata in India, where "Indian officials were so irritated with his mandate that they made it inconvenient for Holbrooke to visit New Delhi. But Holbrooke was keen on taking a regional approach — something that the Pakistanis themselves welcomed. Pakistan has always wanted the United States to serve as mediator in its conflict with India.

The India policy apparatus within the U. Holbrooke finally made it to India in July By that time, he understood that getting it right in Afghanistan meant that India and Pakistan had to start talking — and President Obama and Hillary Clinton agreed. Holbrooke wanted to host a "quadrilateral" dialogue between the United States, Afghanistan, India and Pakistan that would be similar to the trilateral dialogue he had initiated between the United States, Afghanistan and Pakistan.

It was the only way, Holbrooke thought, to fix Afghanistan, where India-Pakistan tensions bolstered local conflicts. Despite minor fits and starts until the day Holbrooke died in December that year, the talks never happened.

Part of the problem went back to what Cohen calls American "organizational pathologies," such as the creation of the SRAP office, which was debilitating for South Asia policy as a whole. It led to "segmented and uncoordinated policymaking," in which offices covering India and Pakistan in the State Department and White House were unable to reconcile opposing viewpoints, became overly turf-conscious, and took on client-like relationships with the countries they worked on.

The memory of the attacks lingered, and lethargic legal systems in both countries meant justice was slow. In , India eventually sentenced to death and hung Ajmal Kasab, the lone surviving attacker. But the case against Pakistani facilitators involved in the attacks still lingers in the Lahore High Court. As for so many other terrorism cases, Pakistani civilians and law enforcement shy away from investigating the LeT for fear of their safety. The Pakistani prosecutor investigating the attacks showed up dead in Levy and Scott-Clark succeed in introducing us personally to the people who died and were injured, and the police officers and government officials who failed in their rapid response.

Readers will finish the book knowing what it felt like to be there, smelling the smoke and hearing the gunfire. The Seige forces all of us to understand the visceral and violent nature of the never-ending India-Pakistan rivalry. When attackers Ajmal, Ismail, Shoaib, and Umer hijacked an Indian fishing trawler while traveling from Karachi across the Arabian Sea, their Pakistani handlers told them to kill Solanki, the Indian captain they held hostage.

The current dependence on China might pay for anti-Indianism for a few more years but is unlikely to help Pakistan overcome its fundamental contradictions.

In the end, Pakistan would still need a new basis for its nationalism that is based on reality rather than engineered narratives of history and aspiration. Currently, ideological reasons dictate that Pakistan remain implacably hostile to India, maintain an expensive military and support jihadi terrorist organizations. But the cost of these policies has debilitating effects like failing to invest in education that develops critical thinking, being less globally connected and losing the economic benefits of being a friendly destination for tourists or investors.

Nor can it expect its international alignments to constantly bail it out of domestic political and economic setbacks. Paranoids do not function well as global citizens and, considering the complexity of sectarian and theological arguments, Pakistan is likely to only descend further into intra-Islamic feuds. Dealing with militarism and support for militancy, as well as their social, political and economic effects, requires amplification of Pakistani voices that question its national narrative and offer an alternative one.

India needs free, fair, non-hyphenated and questioning journalism even more as it faces multiple crises. But the news media is in a crisis of its own. There have been brutal layoffs and pay-cuts. The best of journalism is shrinking, yielding to crude prime-time spectacle. ThePrint has the finest young reporters, columnists and editors working for it.

Sustaining journalism of this quality needs smart and thinking people like you to pay for it. Whether you live in India or overseas, you can do it here.

Support Our Journalism. The article is informative but having much flaws. Writer did not take notice of division of subcontinent that was accepted by colonial power which also supported by International Community.

The much responsibility goes to Britain as well as to Congress and other Hindu leaders including Muslim League that did not have farsightedness. Neither Indian Hindu leaders nor Muslim leaders had work on two nation theory and division of subcontinent. No Hindu and Muslim leaders had true perception of religion in their minds.

Even the leaders did not have knowledge of historical background of sub continent where the vast population reached in subcontinent from Arabian peninsula including Levant region, Europe, Mesopotamia, Azerbaijan and Iran etc.

There is much evidence of continuous inflow of people from this region to India since prehistoric period. The people who were reaching subcontinent were adopting the old convenient culture, but after dawn of Islam that having high standard of morality and justice did not absorb in that culture, but they retained their culture and standards. The Muslims in subcontinent were living in India since one thousand fourteen hundred years. Company Corporate Trends. Defence National International Industry.

International UAE. Saudi Arabia. US Elections World News. Sruthijith K K. Rate Story. Font Size Abc Small. Abc Medium. Abc Large. The first-time Indian visitor to Pakistan is more likely to be struck by our similarities than differences.

The dusty plains of rural Punjab are the same on both sides, complete with crop burning. Lahore looks no different from any major north Indian city. The old city, with its maze of by-lanes, motorcyclists grazing your elbow and little children narrowly avoiding falling into drains, will instantly remind you of Lucknow or Chandni Chowk.

This correspondent was part of a group of Indian journalists invited by the government of Pakistan to cover the opening of the Kartarpur pilgrimage corridor. The security detail was significant. Our Lahore hotel, located on MM Alam Road — named after a fighter pilot and hero of the war with India — was swarming with security personnel. Vehicles with armed men and blazing sirens escorted our bus. Unless you are used to it, this kind of security can be a bit unnerving.

It can feel like attention is being drawn to you, the swirl of red and blue lights marking you out as a target. Pakistan does security a little differently from India. Not for them the commandos in safari suits or plainclothes. The idea is to secure, but also to dissuade with the display of force.